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- The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit held that police would have applied for a search
warrant even absent the information obtained through a warrantless search, and that the
application for a search warrant contained probable cause even if the illegally obtained evidence
was excluded; thus, the independent source doctrine applied, and the evidence obtained from the
search warrant was not suppressed.
United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2009).
On April 5, 2002, Agent Randall Schirra ("Agent Schirra") purchased methamphetamine
from John Joseph Price, Jr. ("Price").' The Commonwealth issued a warrant for Price's arrest,
2
which he managed to avoid for over two years.
Officers from the Attorney General's office and the Pennsylvania State Police finally
arrested Price at work on October 5, 2004. During the agents' search of Price, they found items
indicative of methamphetamine trafficking.4 Agent Schirra left Price with a state trooper and
went to Price's residence.5 At Price's residence, his two children answered the door and said that
no adult was home. 6 The officers called Debbie Fischer ("Fischer"), Prices' common law wife,
and she came home.7
Additional officers arrived on the scene but stayed away from Fischer so as to not make
her feel outnumbered.8 Agent Schirra told Fischer that Price had been arrested and that they had
information that Price synthesized methamphetamine in his home. 9 The officers wanted Fischer
to consent to a search of the residence so they could determine whether it was safe for her and
the children.' 0 The officers did not tell Fischer that no consent was required, did not tell her that
what they found could implicate her, and did not give her a written consent form. 11 Fischer did
not hesitate in consenting to a search. 12  Agent Schirra entered the house with Fischer to
commence the search.13
1. United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2009).
2. Price, 558 F.3d at 273.
3. Id. A source told Schirra that Price was at work. Id.
4. Id. These items include plastic baggies with methamphetamine residue and pH papers. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Price, 558 F.3d at 273. On her way home, Fischer ran out of gas. Id. An officer drove to pick
Fischer up and drove her home. Id.
8. Id. at 273-74.
9. Id.
10. Id. The officers also wanted to search for a reportedly stolen ATV. Id.
11. Id. Schirra did not have a consent form at this point in time. Id.
12. Price, 558 F.3d at 274.
13. Id. Trooper Wilson searched around the outside and eventually found the stolen ATV. Id.
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Fischer and Agent Schirra came across a locked room, and Fischer explained that this
was her and Price's bedroom.14 Fischer had a key, however, and unlocked the door to the
room.15 While unlocking the door, Fischer indicated that there might be pipes because she and
Price smoked but did not produce methamphetamine. 16 Once in the bedroom, Agent Schirra
found two pipes and a baggie of sodium hypophosphite. Fischer then asked him to stop the
search,' 8 so Agent Schirra immediately discontinued his search, and they left the house.19
As the two left the house, Agent Schirra recalled that his sources reported that Price made
the methamphetamine in the garage or basement area of the house. 20 Agent Schirra asked
Fischer how to enter the basement, and she told him the entrance was outside of the house.21
Agent Schirra asked for consent to search the basement, and Fischer replied that the basement
was locked and the she did not possess a key.22 Agent Schirra asked once more if he could have
permission, and Fischer told him that if he could get in without damaging the door, the
authorities could search the basement. 23
Trooper Ron Wilson ("Trooper Wilson") picked the lock and entered to make sure no one
was hiding inside the basement.24 Agent Schirra entered and saw a bag with Sudafed packets
and other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine.25 Agent Schirra exited the
basement and told Fischer that she and the children needed to leave due to the presence of
potentially hazardous chemicals.26 He also suggested that they should seek medical treatment.27
By this time other officers with consent forms had arrived, so Agent Schirra asked Fischer if she
would sign one.2 8 Fischer refused to sign a consent form.29
Because Fischer did not consent to Agent Schirra's further search of the basement, Agent
Schirra had other officers watch over the house and he left to obtain a search warrant. 30 A search
warrant was issued for Price's residence and basement/garage area regarding items related to
methamphetamine storage, production, and consumption. 3 1  The police returned to Price's
residence, executed the search warrant, and seized chemicals used to manufacture
methamphetamine.32
A grand jury, on November 9, 2004, indicted Price on seven counts relating to




17. Price, 558 F.3d at 274.









27. Price, 558 F.3d at 275.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 275-76
31. Id. at 276.




Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ddc.duq.edu/dclj/vol1/iss1/3
United States v. Price
District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Price's
motion to suppress evidence. 34 On June 16, 2006, Price entered a plea of guilty to Count One,
but reserved his right to appeal the portion of his suppression motion that the district court
denied.3 5 The district court sentenced Price to 115 months of imprisonment.36 Price appealed
the district court's decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.37
The issue before the Third Circuit was whether the authorities violated Price's Fourth
Amendment rights when searching his residence.38 Price argued that the authorities did not have
voluntary consent from Fischer to search his house, so the items found in that search should be
suppressed.39 Price also argued that the authorities' warrant application did not have probable
cause because the defective evidence from the bedroom and the findings from the warrantless
search of the basement should not be included in the warrant application. 40 Without probable
cause, Price argued, the evidence seized from the basement after execution of the warrant should
be suppressed.4 1
The court began with a discussion that the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures 42 and that the standard is reasonableness.43 Although there
are exceptions,44 entering a home without a warrant is unreasonable by definition.45 One such
exception is a search with consent.46 The government has the burden to prove that consent was
given in order to justify a search with permission.47 A determination of whether consent is freely
given is based on the totality of the circumstances 48 rather than having a "talismanic
definition." 49 The Supreme Court has suggested factors for consideration, but not definitive
factors that must be taken into account. 0
34. Id. A bag of sodium hypophosphite that was found by police in Price's jacket was suppressed by




37. Price, 558 F.3d at 276.
38. Id. at 277. Another issue before the Third Circuit was whether the government abused its
discretion by not moving, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), to reduce Price's base offense level by one point for
acceptance of responsibility. Id at 283. The Third Circuit rejected Price's claim that the government abused its




42. Price, 558 F.3d at 277.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43. Price, 558 F.3d at 277 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
44. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).
47. Id. at 277-78 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).
48. Price, 558 F.3d at 278.
49. Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224).
50. Id. at 278. The factors a court is to consider are: "the age, education, and intelligence of the
subject; whether the subject was advised of his or her constitutional rights; the length of the encounter; the repetition
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Price contended that the search was invalid, because the authorities did not inform
Fischer that she could refuse.51  He also argued that the search was invalid because the
authorities were lying about their reasoning to search the property; Price alleged they were truly
looking for a methamphetamine laboratory rather than being concerned for Fischer's and the
children's safety.52 The court of appeals held, however, that in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the district court properly determined that the consent to search was voluntary.53
The Third Circuit also explained that Schneckloth54 and Kim55 disprove Price's assertion.56
The court also did not agree with Price's contention that the authorities were not
concerned with Fischer's and the children's safety. The Third Circuit agreed with the district
court that although the authorities may have had two reasons for the search, that fact did not
affect the reality that Fischer's consent was voluntary.
Additionally, Price contended that the warrant applicant should not have included the
evidence found in the bedroom, because the authorities lacked consent to search,59 and the
evidence in the basement because the initial search was warrantless. 60 Price argued that the
additional information in the warrant did not amount to probable cause.61 The Third Circuit held
that even if the evidence from the initial search of the basement was not included in the warrant
application, the warrant application contained probable cause from independent sources.62
or duration of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment." Id. The Third Circuit has also added: "the
setting in which the consent was obtained [and] the parties' verbal and non-verbal actions." Id. (quoting United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003)). The Third Circuit noted that the district court found that
Fischer's consent was voluntary under these factors. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Price, 558 F.3d at 278. The district court found Fischer's consent to be voluntary because:
[S]he was an adult, apparently of average intelligence, who had previous experience with the
criminal justice system. Moreover, 'the atmosphere surrounding the encounter was not hostile,'
since the officers drove her to [Price's] residence after her car ran out of gas, the officers did not
have their guns drawn when they asked for Fischer's consent, Fischer was not verbally or
physically threatened, and only two officers, Schirra and Wilson, discussed Fischer's initial
consent with her in the driveway.
Id.
54. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
55. United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1994).
56. Price, 558 F.3d at 279. In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court held that "[w]hile knowledge of the
right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the [G]overnment need not establish such knowledge as
the sine qua non of an effective consent." Id (alteration in original)(quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The
Third Circuit found that the facts of the instant case were analogous to Kim, where two DEA agents knocked on
Kim's sleeper car on a train and asked if they could search his luggage. Price, 558 F.3d at 279. Kim readily
responded that they could. Id at 279 (quoting Kim, 27 F.3d at 950). This court also noted that the "circumstances
of the encounter were low-key", even more so than in Kim. Id. at 279 (citing Kim, 27 F.3d 947).
57. Id. at 280.
58. Id. The Third Circuit stated: "No doubt, the police certainly were looking for a methamphetamine
lab. But the agents-indisputably-also wanted to make sure that Fischer and the two children were not placed in
danger by the chemicals associated with any such operation." Id. The Third Circuit supports its conclusion with the
fact that Agent Schirra told her and the children to leave and to seek medical attention. Id.
59. Id. The Court notes that it already considered and rejected this argument. Id.
60. Id
61. Price, 558 F.3d at 280.
62. Id The Court noted three issues that the parties disputed on appeal that need not be answered:
First, did Fischer withdraw the initial consent to search that she had provided to Schirra and
Wilson in the driveway, and if so, what was the extent of the revocation? Second, even if Fischer
6 Vol. 1
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United States v. Price
The Third Circuit looked to the independent source doctrine which allows evidence to be
used that was initially obtained illegally but was acquired without regard to the tainted search.63
The Supreme Court had previously decided that a court should not put the police in a worse
position, but should put them in the same position had the misconduct not occurred.64 Excluding
evidence that had an independent source would put the police in a worse position, which the
court does not want to do. 65 The court explained that it must determine whether the police would
have applied for a search warrant even absent the information from the original search.66 The
Third Circuit clarified that it must also decide if there was probable cause for the warrant to be
-67issued.
The Third Circuit decided in this case that the police would have applied for a warrant
even without the evidence from the warrantless search.68 The court also agreed with the district
court that probable cause existed even if the evidence from the basement was not included in the
warrant application.69 Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to deny Price's
motion to suppress the evidence from the basement pursuant to the executed search warrant. 70
The independent source doctrine is invoked when the Fourth Amendment is violated.'
However, the government can use the evidence obtained if the warrant contained sufficient
72
untainted information to establish probable cause. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,73 Justice Holmes noted in dicta that if evidence is not supposed to be acquired in a certain
way, the evidence should not be used at all.74 He continued, however, that if the evidence is
revoked her consent to search the house, and even if that revocation applied to the basement as
well, did Fischer later consent voluntarily to a search of the basement? Third, even if Fischer
voluntarily consented to the basement search, did she have the authority to consent to such a
search?
Id.
63. Id. at 281 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)).
64. Id (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 537).
65. Id.
66. Price, 558 F.3d at 281. (quoting United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1134 (3d Cir. 1992).
67. Id. (quoting Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1134).
68. Id. at 282. The Third Circuit believed that the instant case was very similar to Herrold. Id. The
Third Circuit disbelieved that the police would not have requested a search warrant, with the knowledge that:
1) confidential informants told the police that Price was operating a methamphetamine laboratory
in the basement of [his] residence; 2) Price had sold [Agent] Schirra methamphetamine in the past;
3) when arrested, Price had pH papers and baggies containing methamphetamine residue; and 4)
Price's bedroom contained glass pipes with methamphetamine residue and a baggie of sodium
hypophosphate.
Id.
69. Id. The warrant application would contain three key pieces of evidence, even if it did not refer to
the evidence found in the warrantless basement search:
1) that Price sold [Agent] Schirra 14 gram of methamphetamine on April 5, 2002; 2) that [Agent]
Schirra arrested Price on October 5, 2004, and that when searched, Price possessed 'items
indicative of methamphetamine trafficking, including plastic baggies with methamphetamine
residue and pH papers used to gauge the acidity of the methamphetamine production process'; and
3) that after searching Price's bedroom, [Agent] Schirra found two glass pipes that were consistent
with the ingestion of methamphetamine.
Id.
70. Id. at 283.
71. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 206.
72. Id.
73. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
74. Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.
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gained from an "independent source" it could be proved like any other evidence. The Court
did not explore this idea further for sixty-eight years until Murray v. United States.76
In Murray, the United States Supreme Court was concerned with whether the
independent source doctrine, as applied to the Fourth Amendment, "applies . . . to evidence
initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained
independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality." 77 The Court determined that if
law enforcement later acquired evidence during a lawful entry that was not the result of an initial
unlawful entry, then the independent source doctrine may apply.7 8 In Murray, federal law
enforcement agents were conducting surveillance on Murray based on information from a
confidential informant regarding a conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs. 79  The
agents witnessed Murray and his co-conspirators drive a truck and a camper into the
warehouse.80 Not long later, other persons drove away from the warehouse with the truck and
the camper. Those in the truck and camper were later lawfully arrested and the vehicles, which
contained marijuana, were seized. 82 The agents received this information and forced entry into
the warehouse.83 No one was present, but there were bales wrapped in burlap in plain view.84
The agents later determined that the bales were marijuana.85  The agents did not include
information regarding their prior entry and did not rely on their observations during the entry
when they later applied for a search warrant. 86 The agents again entered after obtaining a
warrant, and seized 270 bales of marijuana and notebooks listing the marijuana customers.1 The
Court ultimately concluded that the case must be sent back to the district court so it could decide
whether the warrant search was independent of the unlawful entry. Nonetheless, the case
established the scope of the independent source doctrine.
Four years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Herrold9
and used the independent source doctrine in its analysis. The issue that the Third Circuit decided
in Herrold was "whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent
source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here." 90 The court asked two questions:
would the police "have applied for the search warrant" without the information from the original
entry and was there probable cause to issue the warrant? 91 The court explained that "under the
75. Id.
76. Murray, 487 U.S. 533.
77. Id. at 537.
78. Id. at 541.
79. Id. at 535.
80. Id.





86. Murray, 487 at 536.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 543-44.
89. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131.
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independent source doctrine, evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or
indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible." 92
Herrold was known to the police as a drug dealer with a record of violent crimes.93
Additionally, the police knew that Herrold had a large quantity of cocaine, some of which he
sold to an informant. 94 A police surveillance team witnessed the informant buy drugs from
Herrold. 95 They also saw Herrold go back into his trailer after selling drugs to the informant. 96
The police inferred that the rest of the cocaine was in Herrold's trailer.97 The informant also
notified the police that Herrold had a gun and was planning on leaving the trailer soon that
night.98 The court reasoned that had Herrold left the trailer, the police would have arrested him
and obtained a search warrant. 99 The court also reasoned that there was sufficient probable cause
to issue the warrant. 00 The affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant explained
that the drugs that the informant bought from Herrold tested positive for cocaine from a field
test. 101
Knowing all of these facts, the court determined that although the police unlawfully
entered the trailer, the police were going to apply for a search warrant prior to actually seeing
what was inside Herrold's trailer.1 02 The court also concluded that the application for the search
warrant contained enough information to establish probable cause without the information from
the officers' prior entry into Herrold's trailer.' 0 3
Ten years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals once again applied the independent
source doctrine in United States v. Burton. 104 The court was faced with the issue of whether
there was "sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause to search [Burton's]
residence."' 0 5 The court followed the rule that "the search warrant need not be invalidated if the
other evidence in the search warrant application affidavit independently would have established
probable cause to search the house."' 06
The application affidavit included the information that an informant saw Burton and
Santiago, a known drug dealer, counting a large amount of money and hearing that they were
conducting a "five brick" deal. 107 Law enforcement believed a "five brick" to mean 1000 grams
of cocaine.108 The court also believed that a canine sniff of Burton's car was a permissible
component of the affidavit.109 The affidavit also provided sufficient information that the
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 1141.





99. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1141.
100. Id. at 1141.
101. Id.
102. Id at 1143.
103. Id. at 1141.
104. United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2002).
105. Burton, 288 F.3d at 103.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 104.
108. Id.
109. Id. The canine signaled that there were illegal drugs in Burton's car. Id.
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residence in question belonged to Burton based on several factors."10 The affidavit also stated
that Burton did not want to tell the authorities his address, which suggested that he wanted to
trick the authorities and supported an inference that contraband was in his house."I
The court concluded that "the Government proffered sufficient evidence in the [warrant
application] affidavit that there was a 'fair probability that contraband' would be found" at
Burton's residence and that "the warrant was validly sought and approved."" 2
The Third Circuit's analysis of the independent source doctrine fits squarely within the
framework of the Supreme Court's analysis in Murray. The Third Circuit continued to follow
Murray 's holding that if law enforcement later acquired evidence during a lawful entry that was
not the result of an initial unlawful entry, then the independent source doctrine can be applied
and the evidence need not be suppressed.1 13  Agent Schirra may have discovered Sudafed
packets, along with other chemical known to be used in methamphetamine production, when he
first entered Price's basement,114 but the warrant application included sufficient additional
evidence to support a finding of probable cause.'
This case does not change police procedure when applying for a warrant effective after
Murray, Herrold, or Burton. The police will continue to need probable cause above and beyond
any evidence obtained through a tainted search. Likewise, trial judges will continue to review a
magistrate's grant of a warrant application by analyzing whether the police would have applied
for the warrant even without the knowledge they gained from a tainted search and if the warrant
application achieved a level of probable cause even when excluding the evidence derived from a
tainted search.1 6 Trial judges had a clear standard to follow under Murray, Herrold, and Burton,
and this case is no exception to the previously established rules.
The Third Circuit clearly came to the correct conclusion by following precedent set not
only within the Third Circuit, but also by precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States.' "
The Third Circuit thoroughly analyzed whether the police would have applied for a warrant had
Agent Schirra not discovered the Sudafed and other chemicals in Price's basement' 18 and
established that probable cause existed in the application for a search warrant absent the evidence
that Agent Schirra uncovered in Price's basement.1 19 The independent source doctrine continues
to balance protecting the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, while also alleviating the police
from being placed in a worse position than it would have been in before a tainted search.
Kristine Maimgren Yeater
110. Burton, 288 F.3d at 104. Burton told law enforcement that he lived there with his grandmother.
Id Another person who was questioned told law enforcement that the house was "Marco's." Id. Marco is Burton's
first name. Id. at 94. Additionally, Burton parked his car close to the house, which indicated that it was his
residence. Id at 104.
111. Id. at 104-05.
112. Burton, 288 F.3d at 105.
113. Murray, 487 U.S. at 541.
114. Price, 558 F.3d at 275.
115. Id. at 282-83.
116. See Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1140.
117. See Murray, 487 U.S. 533.
118. Price, 558 F.3d at 282.
119. Id. at 282-83.
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